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Abstract 
Cognitive-behavioral theory suggests that anxiety-control strategies such as neutralization, 
distraction and various forms of safety behavior have the potential to diminish the effectiveness 
of and/or interfere with exposure treatment.  Yet, it is common practice when treating individuals 
with anxiety disorders to employ various anxiety-control strategies as a means of assisting 
clients/patients with difficult exposure situations.  Questions surrounding the issue of which 
anxiety-control strategies help vs. hinder exposure-based treatments (and under which 
circumstances) have been a topic of much investigation and continue to be a focus of theoretical 
debate.  The present article reviews several key studies which collectively shed some light on 
this debate.  The evidence suggests that clients’ anxiety-control strategies may be less likely to 
become counter-productive when: (i) they promote increases in self-efficacy, (ii) they do not 
demand excessive attentional resources, (iii) they enable greater approach behavior and 
integration of corrective information (via “disconfirmatory experiences”), and (iv) they do not 
promote misattributions of safety.  Theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are 




Keywords: anxiety; neutralization; safety behaviour; distraction; exposure. 
Anxiety-control strategies 3
Anxiety-Control Strategies: Is there Room for Neutralization in Successful Exposure 
Treatment? 
Clinically anxious individuals use a number of strategies to control unpleasant thoughts, 
images and emotions.  Common examples of these strategies include direct (behavioral) 
avoidance, thought suppression, overt compulsions, and various forms of subtle avoidance (e.g., 
distraction, mental rituals, safety-seeking behaviors, etc.).  For the purposes of this review, the 
terms “anxiety-control strategies” and “anxiety-neutralizing behavior” will be used 
interchangeably to refer to these collective acts, given their proposed common function (i.e., of 
controlling - or “neutralizing” - anxiety).   
Cognitive-behavioral theories of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 
1985; Clark, 1999; Salkovskis, 1996) suggest that avoidance and other forms of anxiety-
neutralizing behaviors are counter-productive, such that they provide temporary relief from fear 
and discomfort, yet maintain anxiety in the long run.  Nevertheless, many (subtle) avoidant 
strategies are utilized in clinical practice as a means of easing clients into anxiety-provoking 
treatment situations.  Indeed, Craske, Street and Barlow (1989) note that “distraction is … used 
often, both by clients as a method of coping with high levels of anticipatory anxiety, and by 
therapists in their instruction to clients of ways to approach feared situations” (p.664).  
Salkovskis, Clark and Gelder (1996) make the theoretical distinction between adaptive coping 
strategies (e.g., rationalization, avoidance of real threats), which are employed to manage 
anxiety, and maladaptive safety behaviors (e.g., neutralization, carrying “safety aids”, avoiding 
perceived danger, etc.), which are intended to prevent the occurrence of feared catastrophes.  It is 
hypothesized that maladaptive safety behaviors prevent the unambiguous disconfirmation of 
negative beliefs, thus maintaining the perceived validity of these beliefs and related fears 
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(Salkovskis, 1996).  However, in clinical practice it is often difficult for therapists to discern 
whether their clients’ coping efforts may be counter-productive, and evidence examining this 
issue is mixed (Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).  Thus, it is important to consider the following 
question: “Under what circumstances (if any) can clients’ anxiety-neutralizing behavior facilitate 
exposure treatment for anxiety disorders, and what are the mechanisms involved?”   
The current discussion presents a selective review of findings that pertain to this question.  
Although there is currently no clear consensus regarding the defining features of many of the 
constructs under review, we compare studies that have examined the effects of similar anxiety-
control strategies on exposure-driven fear reduction.  Because the counter-productive effects of 
direct (behavioral) avoidance are well-established, research on this issue is not reviewed here.  
Likewise, the consequences of thought suppression (e.g., Purdon, 1999, 2004; Purdon, Rowa, & 
Antony, 2005; Rassin, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2000) and overt compulsions (e.g., Rachman, 
2002; Salkovskis, 1999) have recently been reviewed elsewhere, and thus, are not covered here.  
The present review focuses on three broad areas of investigation: (i) the effects of distraction on 
fear reduction both during and after exposure (ii) the effects of safety behavior on anxiety and 
fear-related cognitions, and (iii) the effects of neutralization on subsequent anxiety/discomfort 
and urges to neutralize.  Theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed, and 
promising directions for further research are suggested.   
Theoretical Background 
Mechanisms of Fear Reduction 
While anxiety disorders are among the most effectively treated forms of 
psychopathology, the mechanisms by which anxiety and fear reduction occur during exposure 
treatment are not yet fully understood (Hofmann, 2008; Oliver & Page, 2003; McNally, 2007; 
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Schmid-Leuz, Elsesser, Lohrmann, Jöhren & Sartory, 2007).  Traditionally, behavior theorists 
have relied on habituation models (e.g., Groves & Thompson, 1970) to explain these processes.  
These models suggest that conditioned fear responses are subject to extinction with repeated and 
prolonged exposures to feared stimuli, similar to processes involved in habituation to novelty 
(Agras, 1965; Mowrer, 1939; Watts, 1971).  Exposure duration, stimulus intensity and attention 
to phobic cues are hypothesized to be key moderators of fear extinction (Watts, 1971, 1974; 
Watts, Trezise, & Sharrock, 1986).  Accordingly, it is predicted that events or behaviors that 
interfere with these essential components of exposure should compromise the amount of fear 
reduction achieved, as well as increase the probability that the individual will experience a return 
of fear upon subsequent exposures (Watts, 1974).  For example, distraction and other forms of 
cognitive and/or behavioral avoidance during exposure are hypothesized to negatively impact 
upon fear reduction (Rodriguez & Craske, 1993). 
The concept of emotional processing (Rachman, 1980; Foa & Kozak; 1986; Foa, 
Huppert, & Cahill, 2006) was later proposed in an attempt to explain the mechanisms of 
exposure-driven fear reduction from an information processing (i.e., cognitive) perspective.  Foa 
and Kozak’s (1986) theory, which elaborates on the earlier work of Lang (1977, 1984) and 
Rachman (1980), proposes that feared stimuli and their meanings are represented in memory as 
fear “structures” or “prototypes” that consist of associations between fearful emotions, 
cognitions and behavior.  These fear structures can be accessed upon exposure to the 
corresponding feared stimuli.  However, it is hypothesized that for lasting fear reductions to 
occur: (i) the fear structure must be fully activated in memory (as evidenced by heightened 
emotional arousal and self-reports of fear), and (ii) internal representations of the feared stimulus 
must be modified through “corrective information” that highlights the innocuous nature of the 
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stimulus and thereby decreases harm expectancy (see also Hofmann, 2008).  It was originally 
proposed that these necessary conditions serve to weaken associations between elements of the 
fear structure and allow extinction of the fear response to occur.  However, Foa et al. (2006) have 
noted that recent developments in animal research (e.g., Bouton, 2004; Myers and Davis, 2002; 
Rescorla, 1996) suggest that learned safety information creates a new set of associations between 
fear cues and safety (i.e., a “safety structure”) which inhibits the fear response, rather than 
replacing and/or modifying the original fear structure.  Notwithstanding this conceptual revision, 
the emotional processing model predicts that behavioral and cognitive avoidance strategies (e.g., 
safety behaviour, distraction, etc.) that interfere with the activation and/or modification of fear 
structures (or learning of new “safety structures”?) during exposure should hinder fear reduction 
and promote the return of fear. 
In contrast, Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory states that activities that diminish 
emotional arousal and enhance an individual’s perceived sense of personal mastery and control 
(components of “self-efficacy”) in anxiety-provoking situations should facilitate fear reduction.  
For example, distraction and other subtle avoidance strategies may help to diminish anxiety in 
fearful situations, thus allowing phobic individuals to approach feared stimuli for longer periods 
and to gain a greater sense of mastery over their fears (Rodriguez & Craske, 1993).  Therefore, 
Bandura’s social learning framework grants the possibility for anxiety-reducing coping 
mechanisms to facilitate fear reduction under certain circumstances. 
Finally, behavioral neuroscientists have begun to uncover biological mechanisms that 
may influence exposure-driven fear reduction.  For example, it has been established that N-
methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) receptor activity in the amygdala plays an important role in 
diminishing fear in both animals and humans through exposure (Davis, 2002; Walker, Ressler, 
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Lu, & Davis, 2002).  Consistent with this interpretation, recent investigations involving 
individuals suffering with Social Phobia (Hofmann et al., 2006) and Acrophobia (i.e., fear of 
heights) (Ressler et al., 2004) have found that administering the NMDA agonist d-cycloserine 
(DCS) shortly before exposure reliably enhances treatment benefits (i.e., reduction of fear and 
anxiety symptoms) in both the short- and long-term.  Given that DCS administration only 
hastens extinction when used in conjunction with exposure (Walker et al., 2002), it has been 
hypothesized that NMDA receptor activity may serve to consolidate learning of corrective 
information (i.e., safety in the presence of feared cues).  In addition, based on animal research 
(Milad & Quirk, 2002) which has found a negative correlation between activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and return of fear, McNally (2007) has hypothesized that “any 
intervention that can boost activity in the mPFC during exposure to fear provoking stimuli may 
yield therapeutic benefits”.  However, it is not currently known how various anxiety-control 
strategies may affect these cortical processes, and further investigation is required to determine 
their effects. 
Factors Involved in the Maintenance of Fear and Anxiety 
 Salkovskis (1996) describes the “neurotic paradox” as the observation that clinically 
anxious individuals’ fears persist despite experiencing repeated safe encounters with anxiety-
provoking situations.  Behavior theorists have attempted to explain the persistence of these fears 
with the concept of sensitization due to premature termination of exposure (Battersby, 2000).  
However, such accounts fail to explain instances in which fear re-emerges following prolonged 
exposure.  Cognitive theories (Clark, 1999; Salkovskis, 1996; Salkovskis et al., 1996) provide a 
simple explanation for this paradox; it is proposed that phobic individuals’ use of subtle safety-
seeking behaviors during exposure maintains fear and anxiety by preventing the disconfirmation 
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of catastrophic cognitions.  This effect is clearly illustrated in the following hypothetical 
example: A client who believes that they will faint if their anxiety escalates beyond a certain 
threshold may sit down or lean on a wall for support whenever they feel a sudden emergence of 
anxiety symptoms.  When their anxiety passes and they do not faint, they are likely to consider 
the situation a “near miss” and to attribute the non-occurrence of the feared event (i.e., fainting) 
to their preventive efforts, thereby reinforcing their maladaptive beliefs, predictions and behavior 
(Salkovskis, 1996).  As such, it is proposed that individuals who routinely employ safety 
behaviors in anxiety-provoking situations are more likely to experience a return of fear upon 
subsequent encounters with the feared situation(s).  It is also hypothesized that some anxiety-
control strategies have the unintended effect of increasing the individual’s anxious response 
(e.g., sweating, blushing, trembling, etc.), thus initiating a vicious cycle of anxious symptoms 
and behavior (Clark, 1999; Salkovskis, 1996).  Accordingly, proponents of the cognitive theory 
suggest that exposure treatment can only be maximally effective if these subtle avoidance 
behaviors are eliminated. 
 Another phenomenon that may contribute to the long-term maintenance of fear and 
anxiety is the over-prediction of fear.  The over-prediction of fear simply refers to an 
overestimation of how frightened one will be when encountering an anxiety-provoking situation.  
Rachman and colleagues (Rachman & Bichard, 1988; Rachman & Lopatka, 1986a, 1986b) 
propose that over-prediction of fear typically follows aversive experiences in which fear was 
under-predicted (e.g., an unexpected panic episode).  The extreme fear associated with these 
unanticipated panic episodes is hypothesized to subsequently increase anticipatory anxiety and 
fear predictions in situations that resemble the original experience.  According to Rachman and 
Bichard (1988):  
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The tendency to over-predict fear remains relatively unchanged unless and until 
disconfirmations occur.  In most clinically significant fears that are accompanied or 
followed by strongly avoidant behavior, the possibilities of experiencing such 
disconfirmations are limited.  In this way, their over-predictions of fear can be preserved 
from disconfirmation, and continue relatively unchanged (p.308).    
Thus, again a vicious cycle is created in which the over-prediction of fear encourages the use of 
counter-productive avoidant strategies (including subtle avoidance), which, in turn, maintain 
over-predictions.   
Background 
Distraction vs. Focused Attention During Exposure 
 Borkovec and Grayson (1980) suggested that the “objective presentation of stimuli does 
not guarantee functional exposure to those stimuli” (p.118, emphasis added).  They further 
implied that the amount of fear reduction achieved as a result of exposure should be less in cases 
where information processing is compromised (e.g., due to distraction). 
The first study to explicitly test these claims was conducted by Grayson, Foa and 
Steketee (1982), who manipulated participants’ focus of attention during in vivo exposure and 
examined the effects on fear reduction.  In this study, individuals diagnosed with Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (OCD) were exposed to a highly-feared contaminant for 90 minutes on 
each of two consecutive days.  Each participant completed the exposure under conditions of both 
distracted and focused attention, in a counterbalanced design.  In the distracted exposure 
condition, participants held the contaminated object with one hand, while playing a video game 
with the other hand.  In the focused exposure condition, the experimenter had participants talk 
about the contaminant they were holding and the discomfort it aroused.  Consistent with the 
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notion that distraction prevents functional exposure, participants who underwent the distracted 
exposure condition on the first day demonstrated significantly less between-session habituation 
than those who were instructed to focus on the feared stimulus during the first exposure. 
 The same team of researchers attempted to replicate this study using a between-
participants design (Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1986).  Although an identical protocol was used, 
their findings were at odds with those of the original experiment.  Both groups failed to 
demonstrate between-session anxiety reduction, and contrary to expectation, participants who 
completed exposure while distracted reported greater within-session anxiety reduction than 
participants in the focused condition.  In fact, the only finding that suggested an advantage for 
focused exposure was that participants’ heart rate gradually decreased during exposure in the 
focused condition, while high levels of physiological arousal were maintained throughout the 
exposure in the distracted group.   
 Craske, Street, Jayaraman and Barlow (1991) studied individuals with snake and spider 
phobias to determine: (i) how distraction during in vivo exposure affects phobics’ experience of 
fear in the short term, and (ii) whether phobic individuals who are not given any specific 
instructions during exposure will demonstrate a natural tendency to use cognitive avoidance (i.e., 
distraction) to cope with fearful encounters.  Using a repeated measures design, student 
participants were exposed to either a live snake or spider (depending on their primary fear) under 
three conditions: natural exposure, focused exposure, and distracted exposure.  Distracted 
exposure involved listening for key words presented in an audio-taped message and indicating 
each time the key words were played by placing a check mark on a sheet of paper, while 
maintaining visual focus on the feared animal.  In contrast, the focused exposure condition 
involved listening to an audio-taped passage that included instructions to maintain both visual 
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and attentional focus on the feared stimulus (e.g., by examining different aspects of the animal 
closely).  The order of focused and distracted exposure conditions was counter-balanced, and in 
all cases, was preceded by the natural exposure condition and followed by a baseline assessment 
period.  It was found that participants experienced less subjective fear during distracted exposure 
than during focused exposure, regardless of the order of conditions, while heart rate remained 
stable across all conditions.  Also, subjective fear ratings in the natural exposure condition most 
closely resembled those provided by participants in the distracted condition.  The authors 
concluded that distraction may inhibit the immediate elicitation of fear in anxiety-provoking 
situations, and that phobic individuals may naturally tend to counteract attentional biases towards 
threat with cognitive avoidance. 
In a study of individuals with Claustrophobia, Kamphius and Telch (2000) tested several 
predictions derived from emotional processing theory.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four exposure conditions: (i) guided threat reappraisal (GTR), (ii) cognitive load distractor 
task (CL), (iii) GTR + CL, or (iv) exposure only (EO).  In the GTR condition, participants were 
told to attend to evidence concerning the validity of their core fears, while participants in the CL 
condition performed a demanding dual-process distractor task.  Participants in the GTR + CL 
condition were given both sets of instructions, but were told to prioritize the distractor task.  
Overall, participants completed 30 minutes of in vivo exposure, which was broken down into 
blocks lasting a maximum of 5 minutes each.  A number of fear indices (e.g., subjective anxiety 
ratings, peak fear, heart rate variability, etc.) were collected throughout the procedure and 
participants were classified according to end-state functioning at post-treatment and follow-up (2 
weeks) assessments.  Results were generally consistent with predictions derived from emotional 
processing theory.  Although participants in all four conditions demonstrated significant within-
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trial habituation, those in the GTR conditions reported significantly greater reductions in 
subjective anxiety from pre- to post-exposure than participants in the CL condition.  Also, a 
statistical trend suggested that participants in the two distraction groups showed greater return of 
fear at 2-week follow-up.  Thus, in general, results showed that participants’ engagement in a 
cognitive load task during exposure hindered the amount of fear reduction achieved, whereas 
instructions to test negative beliefs led to greater symptom reduction, indicating that cognitive 
factors play a role in exposure-based fear reduction.   
 More recently, Telch and colleagues (2004) asked a group of individuals reporting 
extreme claustrophobic fear to complete a total of 30 minutes of in vivo exposure under one of 
four conditions: (i) increased threat, (ii) neutral, (iii) cognitive load (CL), or (iv) exposure only 
(EO).  The increased threat condition consisted of attending to fear-relevant threat words (e.g., 
trapped, suffocate) and forming images of these words, while participants in the neutral 
condition performed the same task with neutral words (e.g., banana).  Meanwhile, participants in 
the CL condition performed a demanding cognitive task (i.e., the Seashore Rhythm Test; 
Halstead, 1947), which required a great deal of their attentional resources.  Consistent with 
prediction, participants in the CL condition demonstrated less symptom improvement at post-
treatment than participants in the EO condition.  However, contrary to what the emotional 
processing model (Foa & Kozak, 1986) would predict, individuals in the increased threat 
condition did not demonstrate greater fear reduction at post-treatment than participants in the 
neutral or EO conditions.  This finding is particularly noteworthy given that participants in the 
neutral condition performed a threat-irrelevant task which likely functioned as a mild distractor.  
It is important to note however, that the threat manipulation was not effective in eliciting greater 
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fear activation (in terms of subjective ratings and heart rate) during exposure in comparison to 
the other conditions.   
 Most of the evidence reviewed thus far suggests that distraction has the potential to 
hinder exposure treatment and to promote the return of fear.  However, Page and his co-workers 
have provided compelling evidence that at least some forms of distraction during exposure may 
actually facilitate both short- and long-term reductions in fear and anxiety.  In a first study, 
Penfold and Page (1999) examined whether manipulating attentional focus during in vivo 
exposure influenced anxiety reduction among individuals with strong blood and injection-related 
fears.  Participants completed three weekly exposure sessions (duration = 10 minutes) under one 
of three experimental conditions: focused exposure, distracted exposure, or exposure alone.  
Participants in the distracted exposure condition were engaged in neutral (stimulus-irrelevant) 
conversation with the therapist (e.g., regarding plans for the future, hobbies, etc.), while those in 
the focused exposure condition were asked to discuss their thoughts, feelings, and physiological 
reactions to the feared stimuli.  Visual attention was directed towards fearful stimuli regardless 
of condition.  It was argued that stimulus-irrelevant conversation represented a more ecologically 
valid form of distraction than the more “artificial” distractors (e.g., video games, demanding 
cognitive tasks) that had been used in most prior studies.  Results showed that exposure-plus-
distraction led to greater within-session anxiety reduction than focused exposure or exposure 
alone.  However, no group differences were found on a behavioral approach test (BAT) 
immediately following exposure.   
In a second study, Oliver and Page (2003) sought to replicate and extend this finding by 
examining both the short- and long-term effects of manipulating focus of attention during 
exposure.  This study used an identical procedure and participant population (i.e., blood- and 
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injection-fearful individuals) as Penfold and Page’s (1999) prior investigation.  In line with 
emotional processing theory, it was hypothesized that distracted exposure may facilitate within-
session decreases in anxiety, but hinder long-term improvement by interfering with the activation 
of fear structures in memory.  However, contrary to expectation, participants in the exposure-
plus-distraction condition reported the greatest amount of fear reduction both within and between 
sessions.  Furthermore, this advantage was maintained at post-treatment and 1-month follow-up, 
suggesting that conversational distraction during exposure may facilitate both short- and long-
term fear reduction compared to focused and natural forms of exposure. 
 A third investigation (Johnstone and Page, 2004) extended this line of work to include an 
examination of exposure-driven fear reduction among spider phobics.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to either distracted or focused exposure conditions.  As in the previous 
studies, participants were instructed to maintain visual contact with the feared stimulus (a live 
Black House Spider) throughout the exposures, and attention towards the phobic stimulus was 
manipulated via conversational tactics.  However, the exposure schedule was slightly altered in 
this investigation, such that participants completed three successive exposures (duration = 10-
minutes) during their first experimental trial, and an additional exposure session four weeks later.  
Interestingly, it was found that both subjective and physiological indices of fear did not differ 
between groups during the initial moments of exposure.  Also, neither group demonstrated a 
significant return of fear, suggesting that both distracted and focused variants of exposure 
treatment are effective in reducing fear of spiders.  Nonetheless, consistent with Oliver and 
Page’s (2003) findings, participants in the distracted exposure condition reported significantly 
greater within- and between-session anxiety reduction than participants in the focused exposure 
condition, and these results were maintained at 1-month follow-up.  Notably, increases in 
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perceived control were also observed among participants in the distracted exposure group in both 
of these investigations (Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver and Page, 2003). 
 Lastly, another group of researchers (Schmid-Leuz et al., 2007) recently compared the 
effects of distracted versus attention-focused exposure among a group of dental phobics.  
Participants were exposed to a series of fear-eliciting dental tools (i.e., dental probe, drill, needle 
and pliers) according to an idiographically-designed hierarchy.  Acoustic and olfactory stimuli 
that mimicked those commonly experienced during dental procedures were utilized throughout 
the exposure, which lasted 60 minutes for all participants.  In the attention-focused exposure 
condition, participants were instructed to contemplate the function of each tool as they 
manipulated it manually.  In contrast, participants in the distracted condition held the instruments 
in their non-dominant hand while they played puzzle games with the experimenter.  Several fear 
indices (e.g., self-report fear and anxiety ratings, heart rate, state and trait anxiety measures) 
were collected before and immediately following exposure, as well as at 1-week follow-up.  
Contrary to expectation, there were no significant group differences in fear reduction (as 
measured by heart rate and self-report ratings) at post-treatment and 1-week follow-up.  
Likewise, there were no group differences in avoidance of subsequent dental treatments in the 
six months immediately following the study.  In fact, both groups demonstrated significant and 
lasting improvement in phobic symptoms (as measured by self-report anxiety ratings), and the 
only significant group difference that emerged revealed a slight advantage for the focused 
exposure condition in terms of state anxiety ratings.  However, an examination of group means 
suggests that this group difference was slight, and is unlikely to be clinically meaningful.   
Safety Behavior 
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Salkovskis and co-workers (1996) demonstrated that Panic Disorder patients’ choice of 
safety behaviors is logically related to their catastrophic beliefs (e.g., an individual who believes 
they are susceptible to experiencing a heart attack might lay down and raise their feet during 
panic episodes).  The first study to examine whether safety behaviors act to maintain anxiety and 
fear-related beliefs was conducted by the Oxford Group (see Wells et al., 1995).  In this study, 
socially anxious individuals completed two exposure sessions (duration = 5-10 minutes each) in 
which they encountered a situation that they had identified as being highly fearful.  They were 
given different instructions prior to each exposure, and the order of conditions was counter-
balanced.   Prior to one exposure session, a cognitive rationale was used to instruct participants 
to drop their usual safety behaviors.  Prior to the other exposure session, participants were not 
given any specific instructions regarding the use of safety behaviors, and instead were provided 
with a habituation rationale to explain the mechanisms of fear reduction during exposure.  As 
predicted, decreased safety behavior under cognitive rationale was associated with greater 
reductions in participants’ subjective anxiety ratings and anxiety-related beliefs (within-session) 
than natural exposure under habituation rationale.   
Salkovskis, Clark, Hackmann, Wells, and Gelder (1999) found similar results in a study 
of individuals suffering with Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia (PDA).  Participants in this study 
performed an idiographically-designed behavioral approach test (BAT) both prior to, and within 
two days of completing a single, brief exposure session (duration = 15 minutes).  During this 
exposure, half of the participants were instructed to drop their safety behaviours and were given 
a cognitive rationale, while the other half were told to behave as they normally would in the 
feared situation, and were provided with a habituation and extinction rationale.  Again, 
individuals who decreased their use of safety behavior during exposure reported significantly 
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less subjective anxiety and catastrophic beliefs during the follow-up BAT than individuals in the 
control group.   
Similar findings have emerged from several other investigations.  For example, Morgan 
and Raffle (1999) found that specific instructions to diminish the use of safety behavior during 
exposure significantly increased the effectiveness of standard group CBT for Social Phobia.  In 
addition, two studies recently conducted at the University of Texas suggest that safety-seeking 
behavior may be an important factor in the maintenance of claustrophobic fear.  In the first study, 
Sloan and Telch (2002) compared the outcomes of exposure with safety behavior utilization 
(SBU) vs. exposure with guided threat reappraisal (GTR) and exposure only (EO) in a sample of 
claustrophobic undergraduate students.  Participants were randomly assigned to complete six 
brief (5-minute) exposures in a claustrophobic chamber under one of the three conditions 
described above.  Although participants in the SBU condition were made aware of the 
availability of safety aids (e.g., small window in chamber, intercom, etc.), they were not 
specifically instructed to use them.  Meanwhile, participants in the GTR condition were 
instructed to test their catastrophic beliefs while in the chamber, and participants in the EO 
condition were given no instruction.  Results revealed a general advantage for the GTR 
condition, as participants in the SBU group reported the highest ratings of peak fear during BATs 
at post-treatment and 2-week follow-up, while participants’ fear ratings in the EO group fell in 
between those of the other two groups.  Furthermore, participants in the SBU condition exhibited 
significantly less clinical improvement and between-trial habituation than those in the GTR 
condition, whose advantage also generalized (although to a lesser extent) to a second BAT.   
Two additional findings from this study deserve mention.  First, contrary to expectation, 
participants’ heart rate reactivity during the first 5 minutes of treatment did not differ between 
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groups, suggesting that levels of initial fear activation did not affect subsequent fear reduction.  
Furthermore, all participant groups exhibited mean heart rates in the normal (albeit high normal) 
range for adults at rest during BAT tests at pre-treatment (i.e., all group means < 97 bpm).  
Although Foa and Kozak (1986) do not offer specific guidelines regarding the degree of 
physiological arousal (e.g., heart rate bpm) required to facilitate fear extinction following 
exposure, the amount of arousal exhibited by these participants does not appear to have been 
sufficient to “fully” activate fear structures in memory.  Nevertheless, all groups demonstrated 
significant reductions in heart rate reactivity and peak fear from pre- to post-treatment.  This 
finding appears to contradict emotional processing theory.  Second, a significant number of 
participants in the SBU condition reported that they did not actually use any safety behavior 
during exposure.  Accordingly, Sloan and Telch (2002) suggested that perhaps it is not safety 
behavior utilization per se that inhibits fear reduction during exposure, but rather, the availability 
of safety aids that causes this detriment.  A second study conducted by this research team 
(Powers, Smits & Telch, 2004) attempted to address this theoretically important question.  A 
large sample of undergraduates reporting severe claustrophobic fears were randomly assigned to 
one of five conditions: (i) exposure with safety behavior utilization (SBU), (ii) exposure with 
safety behavior availability (SBA), (iii) exposure only (EO), (iv) credible placebo treatment 
(PL), or (v) wait list control (WL).  Results indicated that the PL and WL conditions were the 
least effective in reducing fear, and that approximately twice as many participants in the EO 
condition achieved high end-state functioning at post-treatment and 2-week follow-up as those in 
the SBU and SBA conditions.  Importantly, individuals in the SBU and SBA conditions showed 
equally poor rates of improvement, suggesting that mere availability of safety aids during 
exposure is sufficient to hinder fear reduction. 
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 Finally, Kim (2005) recently explored the specific mechanisms involved in reducing fear 
via exposure with decreased safety behavior.  Kim noted that the Oxford Group studies cited 
earlier (Salkovskis et al., 1999, Wells et al., 1995) were confounded by the fact that participants 
in each group were given a different rationale prior to exposure.  In both studies, participants 
who were instructed to stop using safety behavior were also provided with a cognitive rationale 
for completing exposure treatment.  In contrast, a habituation rationale was provided to 
participants in the control conditions.  As such, the precise mechanisms by which fear reduction 
had been enhanced in the decreased safety behavior groups could not be determined from these 
studies.  It was unclear whether the benefits of reducing safety behavior in these studies were due 
solely to a decrease in the behavior, or whether a cognitive rationale (with an emphasis on the 
disconfirmation of negative beliefs) was also required to achieve these benefits.  To address this 
issue, Kim randomly assigned socially phobic individuals to one of three groups: (i) exposure 
with decreased safety behavior under habituation rationale, (ii) exposure with decreased safety 
behavior under cognitive rationale, or (iii) exposure only.  It was predicted that decreased safety 
behavior under cognitive rationale would produce the greatest reduction in anxiety and 
catastrophic beliefs, and this is indeed what was found.  Thus, Kim concluded that an emphasis 
on disconfirming negative beliefs is crucial in reducing fear via exposure with decreased safety 
behavior.  
 Contrary to the above-reviewed findings, a number of often-neglected studies suggest 
that the use of safety-seeking strategies during exposure may not be universally detrimental.  In 
fact, it has recently been suggested that the judicious use of safety behavior may be entirely 
appropriate under certain circumstances, particularly during the early phases of graded exposure 
treatment (Rachman, Radomsky & Shafran, 2008).  
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 Bandura, Jeffrey and Wright (1974) provided some early evidence for this view in a 
study which examined the effects of providing safety aids to snake phobics during exposure.  In 
their study, participants were offered minimal, moderate or high use of ‘response induction aids’ 
(e.g., gloves) when they were unable to engage in an exposure exercise even after it was modeled 
to them by the therapist-experimenter.  This study found that participants who relied on moderate 
or high levels of what would today be labeled ‘safety behaviors’ experienced marked and 
significantly better improvement (fear reduction) than those who were offered only mild levels 
of these aids.  Given the date of this important experiment, it is not surprising that outcome was 
reported in terms of self-report and approach behavior.  As such, current hypotheses about safety 
behavior preventing the disconfirmation of maladaptive negative beliefs were not assessed.  A 
more recent study (Milosevic, 2006; Milosevic & Radomsky, in press) sought to address this 
issue by randomly assigning snake fearful participants to either a treatment as usual (exposure) 
condition or an exposure-plus-safety-gear condition in which participants could select one or 
more safety aids (e.g., gloves, goggles, protective clothing) for use during 45 minutes of 
exposure-based treatment.  Results indicated that both groups experienced significant and nearly 
identical treatment gains (measured through post-treatment approach behavior, self-reported 
anxiety and negative cognitions/beliefs in the absence of safety gear), indicating that safety gear 
neither interfered with outcome nor with disconfirmatory experiences (Milosevic, 2006; 
Milosevic & Radomsky, in press).  It is important to note that during the first part of the 
exposure session, participants who used safety gear were able to get significantly closer to the 
snake than those in the control group.  Likewise, a larger number of participants in the safety 
gear group were able to touch and/or hold the snake compared to those in the control group, 
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suggesting that the judicious use of safety behaviour (Rachman, Radomsky & Shafran, 2008) 
may present advantages over traditional exposure-based treatments. 
 Additionally, Rachman and colleagues demonstrated that escape behavior (a form of 
safety-seeking) does not always hinder treatment of agoraphobic avoidance in a set of innovative 
studies designed to test the validity of the “golden rule” of exposure (i.e., in order to prevent fear 
sensitization “try never to leave a situation until the fear is going down”; Mathews, Gelder & 
Johnston, 1981, p.182).  In the first of these two studies (de Silva & Rachman, 1984), individuals 
with Agoraphobia performed eight weekly exposure sessions with instructions to either: (i) stay 
in the feared situation until their peak fear had declined by at least 50% (anxiety endurance 
condition), or (ii) withdraw from the situation if their anxiety reached 75% of the highest level 
they could imagine (escape condition).  Measures of self- and clinician-rated anxiety as well as 
agoraphobic avoidance (as indicated by a BAT test) were taken at pre- and post-treatment.  
Notably, both groups showed significant pre- to post-treatment reductions in fear and 
agoraphobic avoidance compared to a wait-list control group, and contrary to the “golden rule” 
of exposure, individuals in the anxiety endurance condition did not exhibit greater improvement 
than those in the escape condition.  A replication of this study (Rachman, Craske, Tallman & 
Solyom, 1986) found similar results, and most importantly, demonstrated that treatment gains 
were maintained among both “endurers” and “escapers” at a 3-month follow-up assessment.  
Consistent with Bandura’s theory, fear reductions were accompanied by increased control 
ratings, especially among participants who were allowed to escape the situation.  Together, these 
studies provide compelling evidence that the judicious use of anxiety-control strategies may not 
be detrimental under all circumstances, and prompt a reconsideration of whether it is necessary 
for clients to endure prolonged high levels of anxiety/distress to benefit from exposure therapy. 
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Neutralization 
 Neutralization behavior, which is generally associated with OCD, has been defined as an 
attempt to “put matters right” or “undo” the potential negative consequences of one’s thoughts 
and/or actions that the individual perceives as dangerous (e.g., repeating positive phrases or 
prayers following blasphemous thoughts to “cancel out” the thoughts and prevent divine 
retribution) (Rachman, 1976b; Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant & Teachman, 1996).  A 
decade ago, Rachman and colleagues (Rachman et al., 1996) set out to validate an experimental 
method for studying neutralization, in a study that was designed to test the hypothesis that 
neutralization resembles overt compulsions.  Based on this hypothesis, it was predicted that 
neutralization of intrusive thoughts would lead to an immediate decrease in anxiety, and that 
preventing neutralization would result in a gradual decay of anxiety and urges to neutralize.  A 
group of non-clinical volunteers who demonstrated thought-action fusion (TAF) were selected to 
participate in this study.  TAF refers to the belief that having unwanted, immoral thoughts: (i) 
might increase the likelihood that negative events will occur (i.e., “Likelihood TAF”) and/or (ii) 
is morally equivalent to performing the inappropriate imagined actions (i.e., “Moral TAF”) 
(Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996).  Participants were asked to imagine a close friend or 
relative and then to insert their name into the following sentence: “I hope _____ is in a car 
accident.”  Next, half of the participants were told that they could do whatever they wished (for 2 
minutes) to undo (i.e., neutralize) the effects of the sentence, while the other participants were 
instructed to do nothing to neutralize their thoughts during the next twenty minutes (although 
they were allowed to read a magazine).  The variables of interest were then measured and 
instructions were reversed for each group.  Thus, a final assessment was conducted twenty-two 
minutes after the initial anxiety provocation.  The authors’ predictions were largely supported, 
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and it was concluded that neutralization behavior is likely to be counter-productive in the long 
run. 
 A group of researchers from the Netherlands have since conducted two investigations 
using a slight variation of this protocol.  The first of these studies (Hout, Pol, & Peters, 2001) 
aimed to replicate Rachman et al.’s (1996) findings.  However, measures of anxiety and urges to 
neutralize were taken at equal points in time for both experimental groups, unlike Rachman and 
colleagues’ study.  Hout and colleagues found that participants in both the neutralization and the 
neutralization prevention groups reported a significant decrease in anxiety and urges to check 
after only two minutes.  Given that spontaneous decay of compulsive urges takes much longer to 
achieve (Rachman, de Silva, & Roper, 1976), the authors questioned the assumption that 
neutralization is functionally equivalent to overt compulsions.  The second study conducted by 
this group (Hout, Kindt, Weiland, & Peters, 2003) used a similar protocol, however, participants 
were instructed to either (i) neutralize, (ii) perform a cognitive distractor task (mental 
arithmetic), or (iii) they were given no particular instructions following the anxiety provocation.  
Interestingly, participants in the “no instruction” group reported neutralizing their thoughts as 
much as participants in the instructed neutralization group, suggesting that even non-clinical 
individuals may spontaneously neutralize.  Consistent with their previous results, it was found 
that all three groups demonstrated equal reductions in anxiety from initial provocation to the 2-
minute assessment point.  Furthermore, there were no group differences in subjective anxiety 
when the anxiety-provoking thought was later re-introduced into consciousness.  Thus, it was 
concluded that reductions in anxiety following unpleasant thoughts are not likely due to the 
effects of neutralization, but instead might result from other processes such as rationalization. 
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In a study aimed at uncovering factors involved in the etiology of OCD, Salkovskis, 
Westbrook, Davis, Jeavons and Gledhill (1997) examined the effects of neutralization on 
individuals’ subsequent discomfort and urges to neutralize.  In this experiment, non-clinical 
participants recorded a 20-second narrative describing their most frequently experienced and 
highly repugnant obsession onto a looped tape.  Next, they listened to this intrusive thought 
repeatedly during two exposure sessions.  During the first session, half of the participants were 
instructed to neutralize their intrusion, while the other half of participants were instructed to 
count backwards, in order to control for any maladaptive effects that may be associated with 
distraction.  During the second session, all participants refrained from neutralizing or counting.  
As expected, participants who neutralized their obsession reported greater decreases in 
discomfort during the first phase of the experiment.  However, they also reported greater 
discomfort and urges to neutralize during the second exposure than individuals who had 
previously used distraction.  A replication of this study was recently carried out in a clinical 
OCD sample, and similar results were found (Salkovskis, Thorpe, Wahl, Wroe, & Forrester, 
2003).  Taken together, these results suggest that neutralization of intrusive thoughts is likely to 
be counter-productive in the long run, and may contribute to the development of clinical 
obsessions and compulsions. 
Summary of Findings 
Fear Reduction 
 Contrary to predictions set forth by habituation/extinction models of fear reduction, a 
large number of studies examining the effects of attentional focus during exposure (Craske et al., 
1991; Grayson et al., 1982, 1986; Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & Page, 2003; Penfold & 
Page, 1999; Schmid-Leuz et al., 2007) have failed to demonstrate negative short-term effects in 
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association with distraction.  In fact, several studies have shown that in comparison to attention 
focusing (Craske et al., 1991; Grayson et al., 1986; Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & Page, 
2003; Penfold & Page, 1999) and exposure alone conditions (Oliver & Page, 2003; Penfold & 
Page, 1999), distraction may actually facilitate within-session fear reduction.  Likewise, several 
studies have shown that the judicious use of safety aids does not interfere with exposure 
treatment (de Silva & Rachman, 1984; Rachman et al., 1986; Milosevic, 2006; Milosevic & 
Radomsky, in press), and may actually improve treatment outcomes under certain circumstances 
(Bandura et al., 1974). 
On the other hand, recent studies have also suggested that cognitive load during exposure 
is associated with less within-session fear reduction than threat reappraisal (Kamphius and Telch, 
2000) and exposure only conditions (Telch et al., 2004).  Moreover, it has been found that the 
availability and/or use of safety behavior during exposure inhibits short-term fear reduction in 
comparison to threat reappraisal (Sloan and Telch, 2002) and exposure only (Powers et al., 2004) 
conditions.   
Return of Fear 
The group of studies reviewed above that assessed return of fear following exposure 
reported mixed results.  Four of these studies (Grayson et al., 1982; Kamphius & Telch, 2000; 
Powers et al., 2004; Sloan and Telch, 2002) reported findings consistent with habituation-based 
and emotional processing accounts.  Grayson et al. (1982) found that distraction during exposure 
significantly hampered between-session habituation, while Kamphius and Telch (2000) reported 
a trend towards greater return of fear in distracted vs. natural and focused (i.e., threat reappraisal) 
exposure conditions.  Likewise, Sloan and Telch (2002) found a significantly greater return of 
fear (at 2-week follow-up) among participants who were allowed to use safety behavior during 
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exposure compared to individuals who were instructed to test their catastrophic cognitions.  
Finally, Powers et al. (2004) demonstrated that a mere availability of safety behaviors during 
exposure was sufficient to compromise between-session habituation in comparison to natural 
exposure. 
In contrast, Page and co-workers’ (Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & Page, 2003) 
findings appear to be more consistent with Bandura’s (1977) self-efficacy model.  In conjunction 
with significantly greater increases in perceived control, participants who were mildly distracted 
during exposure exhibited less return of fear than participants in focused (Johnstone & Page, 
2004; Oliver & Page, 2003) and exposure only (Oliver & Page, 2003) conditions.  Similarly, 
Rachman and colleagues (1986) found that providing clients with the option to escape during 
exposure to agoraphobic situations led to higher ratings of control relative to clients who were 
instructed to endure their anxiety, and did not lead to a subsequent return of fear. 
Subjective Anxiety 
Consistent with cognitive theory, a number of investigations have demonstrated that 
neutralization of intrusive thoughts (Hout et al., 2001, 2003; Rachman et al., 1996; Salkovskis et 
al., 1997, 2003) and distraction (Schmid-Leuz et al., 2007) are associated with short-term 
reductions in subjective anxiety.  It has also been shown that comparable reductions in self-
reported anxiety can be achieved within two minutes of anxiety provocation when neutralization 
is prevented (Hout et al., 2001, 2003).  This finding suggests that other processes such as 
rationalization may be involved in alleviating anxiety provoked by distressing thoughts (Hout et 
al., 2003).  Furthermore, Hout et al. (2003) found that anxiety experienced upon re-exposure to 
intrusive thoughts did not differ between individuals who had previously neutralized their 
thoughts and those who did not.   
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In contrast, the Oxford Group found that neutralization was associated with the 
maintenance of discomfort and urges to neutralize in studies of both non-clinical (Salkovskis et 
al., 1997) and clinical (Salkovskis et al., 2003) individuals.  In addition, safety behavior use 
during exposure to anxiety-provoking situations has been shown to inhibit anxiety reduction 
immediately following the exposure (Kim, 2005; Salkovskis et al, 1999; Wells et al., 1995).  
Catastrophic Beliefs 
Similar to subjective anxiety, probability estimates regarding the likelihood of feared 
consequences were found to immediately decrease following neutralization (Rachman et al., 
1996).  Although follow-up data were not collected in this study, two related investigations 
(Salkovskis et al., 1997, 2003) found that individuals who neutralized distressing thoughts 
exhibited subsequent increases in discomfort and urges to neutralize.  Based on Salkovskis et 
al.’s (1996) observation that anxiety-neutralizing behavior is motivated by catastrophic beliefs, it 
is possible that the return of discomfort and urges to neutralize among these individuals resulted 
from a re-emergence (or re-activation) of catastrophic beliefs.  Lastly, three additional studies 
that included explicit measures of catastrophic belief (Kim, 2005; Salkovskis et al, 1999; Wells 
et al., 1995) found that a reliance on safety behavior during exposure to anxiety-provoking 
situations was associated with greater belief in the likelihood of feared consequences.  However, 
it has also been shown that the use of safety behavior during exposure does not necessarily 
prevent the disconfirmation of catastrophic beliefs (Milosevic & Radomsky, in press).   
Discussion 
 The purpose of this paper was to assess whether there are circumstances in which 
anxiety-neutralizing behavior may facilitate exposure and treatment of anxiety disorders.  
Toward this aim, a number of empirical studies investigating potential moderators of exposure-
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based treatment (i.e., distraction, safety behavior, neutralization) have been reviewed.  While 
several factors limit our ability to make solid inferences based on the available evidence, some 
tentative conclusions seem justified. 
 Overall, the studies reviewed above support the increasingly accepted view that anxiety-
neutralizing strategies have the potential to become counter-productive by promoting 
misattributions of safety, undermining self-efficacy and/or interfering with other possible 
mechanisms of fear reduction during exposure (e.g., emotional processing).  This was especially 
apparent among studies which examined the disruptive effects of neutralization (Salkovskis et 
al., 1997, 2003), certain types of safety-seeking behavior (Kim, 2005; Morgan & Raffle, 1999; 
Powers et al., 2004; Salkovskis et al., 1999; Sloan & Telch, 2002; Wells et al., 1995) and heavy 
distraction during exposure (Grayson et al., 1982; Kamphius & Telch, 2000; Telch et al., 2004).  
Although Hout et al. (2003) found that participants in their ‘neutralization’ condition did not 
report greater increases in anxiety upon re-exposure to the thought than those who were 
instructed to ‘do nothing’, minimal efforts to neutralize the thought were reported by participants 
in both conditions (i.e., mean ratings of 22 [SD = 28] vs. 10 [SD = 22] out of 100, respectively).  
As such, the clinical relevance of this finding must be called into question.  Thus, the majority of 
evidence provided by these studies indicates that anxiety-control strategies commonly used by 
phobic clients may be detrimental in the long run. 
On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that clients’ anxiety-control strategies 
are not inevitably detrimental to exposure treatment (Bandura et al., 1974; deSilva & Rachman, 
1984; Rachman et al., 1986; Schmid-Leuz et al., 2007; Milosevic & Radomsky, in press).  In 
fact, it appears that certain types of subtle avoidance might actually help anxious individuals to 
achieve greater success in exposure-based treatments.  More specifically, stimulus-irrelevant 
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conversation during exposure has been shown to produce anxiolytic effects which are both 
durable and robust (Johnstone & Page, 2004; Oliver & Page, 2003), unlike some other forms of 
distraction (e.g., demanding cognitive tasks) which have been shown to hinder treatment 
(Kamphius & Telch, 2000; Telch et al., 2004).  Therefore, it is important to clarify what precise 
mechanisms distinguish conversation from other types of distraction which serve to maintain fear 
and anxiety.  A detailed inspection of the studies reviewed above offers some preliminary clues 
to this distinction. 
First, both Oliver and Page (2003) and Johnstone and Page (2004) found that participants 
who engaged in stimulus-irrelevant conversation during exposure reported subsequent increases 
in perceived control.  As predicted by social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), this increase in 
perceived control was associated with reduced fear responding in the presence of anxiety-
provoking stimuli.  Although direction of causality cannot be inferred from these investigations, 
this finding lends support to the theory that perceived mastery over feared situations is an 
important moderator of fear reduction (Bandura, 1977; see also Powers, Smits, Whitley, 
Bystritsky & Telch, in press).  However, a comparison of changes in perceived control following 
helpful vs. harmful forms of distraction is not currently possible, as this construct was not 
measured in those studies that found distraction to be counter-productive.  Nevertheless, it is 
conceivable that stimulus-irrelevant conversation during exposure contributed to subsequent 
increases in perceived control and self-efficacy through a variety of possible means.  For 
example, the pleasant topics of conversation used to distract participants in the aforementioned 
studies (e.g., discussion of hobbies, travel plans, etc.) may have helped to promote a state of 
relaxation during exposure.  According to Bandura, relaxation in the presence of feared stimuli 
can greatly affect perceptions of self-efficacy, as emotional arousal is hypothesized to be an 
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important source of information regarding one’s ability to cope.  Similarly, Wolpe’s (1954, 
1968) theory of reciprocal inhibition states that inducing relaxation during exposure to phobic 
stimuli should facilitate fear extinction via counter-conditioning processes.  Although relaxation 
(e.g., progressive muscle relaxation [PMR]) has not been found to be an essential component of 
exposure treatment (McNally, 2007), it is plausible to hypothesize that anxious individuals may 
have felt empowered by their ability to relax during the exposure, resulting in adaptive belief 
change (e.g., “If I am able to relax in the presence of my worst fear and nothing terrible happens, 
I must not be in danger after all”) (Johnstone & Page, 2004), and a re-interpretation of the 
meaning of previous anxious symptoms (e.g., “Perhaps my anxiety does not always signal real 
danger”).  In contrast, other forms of distraction may be less conducive to relaxation and mastery 
experiences.  In fact, distractors that were used in some of the other studies reviewed above (e.g., 
video games, cognitive load tasks) may have exerted the opposite effect, giving rise to 
hyperarousal, frustration, excitement or anticipation (Rodriguez & Craske, 1993).  Thus, unlike 
more intense distractors, calming conversation and other “mild” distractors might promote 
increases in self-efficacy during exposure to feared stimuli through increased relaxation, 
increased perceptions of control and/or belief change, which in turn, may facilitate fear 
reduction.  Furthermore, presuming that affect and physiological arousal experienced during 
exposure influence fear-related cognitions and beliefs, “moderate” distractors such as the puzzle 
game utilized by Schmid-Leuz and co-workers (2007) may fail to exert an effect on exposure-
driven fear reduction since they are less likely to promote a heightened state of anxiety or 
relaxation. 
Another factor that may have contributed to differences between helpful and disruptive 
forms of distraction is the amount of cognitive demand placed on the individual by each type of 
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task.  Presumably, stimulus-irrelevant conversation required less attentional resources than the 
distractors employed in the other studies reviewed above (e.g., cognitive load and dual-process 
tasks, puzzle and video games).  In comparison to other forms of distraction, conversation may 
have allowed greater integration of corrective information during exposure, thereby promoting 
the disconfirmation of negative beliefs and enabling emotional processing to occur.  Consistent 
with this interpretation, Telch et al. (2004) have suggested that “it is not distraction per se that 
interferes with fear reduction, but the extent to which the distractor task makes attentional 
resources less available for cognitive processing during exposure” (p.230).  However, both 
Penfold and Page (1999) and Oliver and Page (2003) found that distracted exposure led to 
greater fear reduction than exposure alone.  Given that exposure-only conditions do not require 
any additional cognitive resources, this finding appears somewhat counter-intuitive, and remains 
to be fully explained. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that treatment is facilitated by an optimal 
level of attentional focus toward feared stimuli during exposure.  According to this hypothesis, 
one would expect that excessive focus on feared stimuli might increase perceptions of threat and 
heighten anxiety to levels that undermine emotional processing or increase subsequent fear 
predictions, while too much distraction might inhibit fear reduction by diminishing cognitive 
resources available for emotional processing (see Antony, McCabe, Leeuw, Sano and Swinson, 
2001; see also Johnstone & Page, 2004, McNally, 2007; Rodriguez & Craske, 1993).  Consistent 
with this theory, Johnstone & Page (2004) found that only individuals who were low on initial 
anxiety benefited from focused exposure in their study.  Therefore, it is possible that mild 
distractors such as stimulus-irrelevant conversation may provide an optimal amount of 
distraction from threatening stimuli, while helping to maintain a sufficient level of anxiety to 
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activate fear structures, thereby facilitating the integration of corrective information during 
exposure.  Similarly, mild distraction during exposure might create an optimal environment for 
the consolidation of extinction learning (e.g., by stimulating the medial prefrontal cortex, 
increasing NMDA receptor activity, etc.), unlike “heavy” forms of distraction, which may inhibit 
these cortical processes.  Of course, these hypotheses are purely speculative, and await empirical 
validation.  
In summary, clients’ anxiety-control strategies appear less likely to become counter-
productive when the following four conditions are met: (i) they promote increases in self-
efficacy (via relaxation, positive affect, belief change, and/or other means), (ii) they do not 
demand excessive attentional resources, (iii) they enable greater approach behavior and 
integration/consolidation of corrective information (via “disconfirmatory experiences”), and (iv) 
they do not promote misattributions of safety.  However, further research is required to 
determine the validity of these postulates.  Also, it remains to be established which of these 
conditions are necessary and/or sufficient to prevent return of fear following exposure.  
Importantly, these observations also highlight the fact that clients’ array of anxiety-control 
strategies cannot be classified as helpful or disruptive solely on the basis of presentation (i.e., 
form).  Rather, such classifications require a consideration of the individuals’ intention in 
performing the behavior, the perceived function and consequences of the behavior, and the 
context in which the act is carried out (Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).   
Clinical Implications 
A number of practical implications follow from the evidence reviewed in this article.  
First of all, the extant literature does not support the notion that anxiety-control strategies are 
always detrimental to exposure therapy, or that it is necessary to completely eliminate their use 
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in order to achieve positive treatment outcomes.  In fact, non-clinical individuals routinely 
employ anxiety-control strategies (e.g., distraction, superstitious acts, etc.) in a variety of 
circumstances and without significant negative consequences, suggesting that “normative” use of 
these strategies may serve an adaptive function under certain circumstances.  Similarly, the 
judicious use of anxiety-control strategies during the early stages of exposure may facilitate 
treatment by better enabling clients to approach and/or attend to feared stimuli and to process 
corrective information (Rachman et al., 2008).  Such techniques are commonly employed in 
clinical practice (e.g., when creating exposure hierarchies), and may be particularly effective if 
they are framed within the context of behavioural experiments (i.e., hypothesis testing), or if they 
are conceptualized as “stepping stones” en route to patients’/clients’ mastery of feared situations. 
That said, the potentially adverse effects of anxiety-control strategies on treatment 
effectiveness should not be ignored.  Rather, the evidence clearly indicates that clients should be 
warned about the potential negative consequences of neutralization, and should be encouraged to 
promptly discontinue their use of any anxiety-control strategies that are intended to prevent 
feared events, lest they promote misattributions of safety (Salkovskis et al., 1996).  Likewise, 
clients should be instructed to stop utilizing anxiety-control strategies that are likely to foster 
complete cognitive avoidance of feared stimuli, as such avoidance strategies may prevent 
emotional processing and/or extinction learning.  Accordingly, it is essential for clinicians to 
conduct a detailed functional assessment of anxiety-control strategies when treating clinically 
anxious individuals.  This crucial step helps to ensure that therapists understand their 
clients’/patients’ intentions in performing these behaviours, as well as their explanation for why 
they have successfully averted feared catastrophes in the past.1   
Future Directions 
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 A major obstacle to further progress in this area is the current lack of operational 
definitions for the primary constructs of interest.  For example, descriptions of “neutralization” 
have varied widely from “attempts to put matters right” (Rachman, 1976) to “any voluntary, 
effortful cognitive or behavioral act that is directed at removing, preventing, or attenuating a 
thought or the associated discomfort” (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997).  Similar ambiguity exists 
for the concepts of “safety-seeking behavior” and “distraction” (see Rodriguez & Craske, 1993, 
for a detailed discussion of this issue).  Consequently, different studies have used different 
methods to examine the effects of various coping strategies, making it extremely difficult to 
compare findings across these investigations (Antony et al., 2001).  Therefore, the first priority 
for researchers in this area should be to establish widely-accepted operational definitions for 
these constructs, in order to facilitate cross-study comparisons and to promote the generation of 
new and testable theories.  Furthermore, it is important that definitions of these constructs do not 
include reference to their effects on exposure, lest they rely on circular reasoning.  Instead, the 
operational definitions for these anxiety-control strategies should focus primarily on the form 
and function of these acts (Thwaites & Freeston, 2005).   
 In addition, future studies should place a greater emphasis on measuring the long-term 
effects of anxiety-neutralizing behavior.  There is a grave lack of longitudinal research in this 
area, which is surprising, given the theorized importance of long-term maladaptive consequences 
associated with anxiety-control strategies.  Similarly, future investigations would benefit from 
attempts to maximize the ecological validity of their experimental manipulations.  In order to 
translate research findings into practical advice for clients, it will be essential to study the effects 
of anxiety-control strategies that are actually used by clinically anxious individuals.  Lastly, the 
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development of standardized protocols for studying these behaviors would greatly facilitate the 
comparison of results across studies (Rose & McGlynn, 1997). 
Once these goals have been achieved, several other questions can be tackled.  For 
example, what are the primary mechanisms through which anxiety-neutralizing behaviors exert 
their disruptive effects (e.g., interference with anxious arousal and/or emotional processing, 
maintenance of low self-efficacy beliefs, misattributions of safety, etc.)?  Likewise, what are the 
cognitive and neurological mechanisms involved where anxiety-control strategies improve the 
outcome of exposure treatment (e.g., increased self-efficacy, decreased harm expectancy, 
activation of NMDA receptors)?  Is it necessary to fully activate “fear structures” during 
exposure (e.g., to induce anxious hyperarousal in clients) in order to modify catastrophic beliefs 
and achieve lasting fear reduction?  (How) does the use of anxiety-neutralizing behavior affect 
subsequent fear predictions?  Do clients’ moods influence their choice of anxiety-control strategy 
and/or their interpretation of exposure treatment outcomes?  Are anxiety-control strategies more 
disruptive when used to counter hypothetical fears (such as those frequently encountered in OCD 
and health anxiety)?  Can universally adaptive coping strategies (e.g., rationalization?) be 
identified and taught to clients?  All of these questions are ripe for investigation, and progress in 
each of these areas should help to bridge the gaps between theory, research and clinical practice.
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 1 Also, see Powers et al. (in press) for a detailed discussion of the importance of assessing 
clients’ attributions of treatment success. 
 
